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A
mAbstract
We study the effect of standardized external tests on students’ academic outcomes.
We exploit the fact that only one of the 17 Spanish regions started doing and
publishing the results of standardized tests in 2005 and apply a difference-in-difference
methodology using outcomes of the PISA study from 2000 to 2009. We later confirm
our results using synthetic control methods. Employing data from a single country
allows us to minimize biases arising from differences in legal frameworks, social or
cultural environments. Our econometric analysis lends plausibility to the hypothesis
that this type of test significantly improves student outcomes. A key novelty is that
our exams do not have academic consequences for the students, so effects have to
come directly from the impact on teachers and administrators.
JEL codes: I20, I21
Keywords: External and standardized tests; PISA; Difference-in-difference; Synthetic
control methods1 Introduction
External standardized tests allow the administration to better monitor the education
process and outcomes of the schools. In most of the countries that have these tests, the
results of the exam are public and can be used by parents to make decisions.1 This closer
monitoring by parents and administrators provides an additional motivation for teachers
and principals to improve the education results of their students. This potential for im-
provement has encouraged an increasing number of countries to use external examina-
tions as a tool to increase accountability. The Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA) report (OECD 2010) documents the fact that 22 out of the 34 OECD
countries have introduced standards-based external examinations in a majority of their
schools. Two more countries, Germany and the US, have this type of tests only in some
of their Ländern and states. All in all, two-thirds of the 15-years old OECD students at-
tend schools in which there is an external and standardized test.
The existing empirical evidence is supportive of the hypothesis that countries with
external exit-exam systems have a better performance in international student achieve-
ment tests. The first evidence for this was given by Bishop (1997) for students doing
the 1991 IAEP math, science, and geography tests and Bishop (2006) with the PISA
2000 results. Overall, the existing cross-country evidence suggests that the effect of ex-
ternal exit exams on student achievement may well be half or more of a grade-level2015 Anghel et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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international tests (OECD 2010 and 2012 and Hanushek and Woessmann 2011).
This evidence has been criticized on two grounds. First, these studies use cross-
sectional data, which does not allow to account for unobserved heterogeneity that
could be correlated with both the introduction of an external test and test outcomes.
With panel data or with the synthetic control method that we use, it becomes possible
to deal with the fact that adoption of testing by a country may be endogenous, and un-
observed heterogeneity could bias the results. Second, the introduction of external tests
may lead to “teaching to the test.” However, some studies have found the same positive
association between central exams and student achievement within countries where
some regions have external exam systems and others do not have them.2 This evidence
rules out the possibility that unobserved national-level factors correlated with the exist-
ence of tests drive the observed positive correlation between those tests and students’
outcomes. In addition, students in countries with national external exams have been
found to achieve better results in other international tests such as PISA, PIRLS or
TIMMS. To the extent that those tests are different in nature from national ones, it
may rule out whether “teaching to the test” is a main factor driving the better outcomes
of students in countries or regions with national external exams.
A different critique of earlier studies is that they are not very clear on what are the
channels through which exit exams are effective. This is because, for the most part,
these exams have academic consequences for the students, thereby providing reasons
for improvement both to the professionals and to the students. The present study uses
a special feature of the Spanish education system to tease out school and student incen-
tives, while at the same time controlling for biases arising from unobserved national-
level heterogeneity and arguably also “teaching to the test.”
The special feature to which we refer is that the main Spanish education law (Ley
Orgánica de la Educación, LOE 2006) allows regions to conduct education system
assessments as long as the results are not used for grading students or ranking schools
(article 140). That means Spanish exams are not “Curriculum-Based External Exit
Examination (CBEEE)” as defined by Bishop (1997) because such examinations
should “offer signals of student accomplishments that have real consequences for the
student and define achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other
students in the classroom or the school.” This means that the effects of such exams
in Spain, if any, have to come directly only from changes in incentives for schools,
although in the end those can, and probably will, have an impact on the students’
efforts.
The region of Madrid introduced a standard external test called “prueba de Conoci-
mientos y Destrezas Indispensables” (also known in short as the CDI test), which means
“Indispensable Knowledge and Skills exam,” in the academic year 2004/05. The grade
achieved by the student in this exam does not have “real academic consequences” for
most students, so it cannot be considered a CBEEE.3 So the effects of this initiative will
necessarily only go directly through changes in teacher motivation. The region of
Madrid is also the only one that publishes and makes available to the public the average
results of the external test of each of the schools. Other regions have external standard-
ized exams where all schools are tested, but Madrid is the only one publishing the
results.
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ciples, objectives, and organization of the different school levels (pre-primary, primary,
compulsory secondary, post-compulsory secondary) as well as up to 65% (55% in his-
torical regions) of the content and subjects studied. Hence, the other main observable
difference in education between Spanish regions is the appearance in the period of
study of this standardized external exam in Madrid, whose results are published.
This feature allows us to conduct a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff ) analysis
comparing the PISA results of the treated region (Madrid) before and after the CDI test
was introduced with the rest of Spanish regions before and after the treatment. This
diff-in-diff approach allows us to control for the unobservable time-invariant factors af-
fecting Madrid. By working with regions of the same country, we also exclude some un-
observable effects that appear in cross-country studies with different legislations and
cultures.
The fact that we are dealing with a single country also allows us to apply the new infer-
ential methods of synthetic control for comparative case studies proposed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). We use a combination of other Spanish
regions to construct a synthetic control region, which resembles similar education charac-
teristics to Madrid before the introduction of the CDI test. The subsequent educational
outcome evolution of this “counterfactual” Madrid without CDI is compared to the actual
experience of Madrid. The idea behind the synthetic control approach is that a combin-
ation of units often provides a better comparison for the unit exposed to the intervention
than any single unit alone. Transparency and safeguards against extrapolation are two at-
tractive features of the synthetic control method relative to traditional regression
methods.
Our results are also more protected than others from the critique that they are
achieved by “teaching to the test.” This is because our measure of outcome, namely,
the results in the PISA exam, have somewhat distinct objectives and measure different
things than the CDI exam in whose effect we are interested. The Madrid CDI exam
questions evaluate knowledge, and they are directly related to material seen in language
and mathematics classes during the academic year. In contrast, the PISA exam ques-
tions (called stimulus) are more related to cognitive processes (access and retrieve; inte-
grate and interpret; reflect and evaluate) and on how to use knowledge in particular
contexts. That is, the PISA evaluation is more related to competencies, whereas the
Madrid CDI is more related to knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in some detail the institutional
setup and the external and standard CDI test. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4
discusses the econometric methodology, and it contains the main results of the paper.
Section 5 shows the results of the synthetic control methods. Section 6 concludes.2 Institutional setup
The Madrid regional government has been conducting since the academic year 2004/05 a
standardized external exam for all 6th grade students in the region, who are hence in the
final year of primary school (around 11–12 years old). Three years later, the region intro-
duced another standardized and external exam in the 9th grade (the third year of second-
ary school, which is the last common academic year for the students). These exams are
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sures what the authorities consider basic knowledge in mathematics (exercises and
problems) and language (dictation, reading, general knowledge and questions related
to a text).
Our aim is to test whether the introduction of these exams has improved the academic
outcomes of the students in Madrid. We use as a measure of student achievement the
scores of the exams conducted for the OECD Program for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA). PISA analyses the key competencies in reading, mathematics and science of
15-year-old students in OECD member countries and partner countries/economies
through its triennial surveys. The metric for the overall scale in one of the subjects is
based on a mean for OECD countries set at 500, with a standard deviation of 100. PISA
conducted its first tests in 2000, covering reading as a major assessment area and provid-
ing a summary profile of the skills of mathematics and science. In 2003, mathematics was
the main focus, and in 2006 it was science. In 2009, PISA started another cycle, focusing
on reading again and in 2012 focusing on mathematics. When an area is the main focus
of the exam, two-thirds of the exam time is devoted to this area, allowing for its deeper
analysis. Since both PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 focused on reading, and both PISA 2003
and PISA 2012 focused on mathematics, it is possible to obtain very detailed comparisons
of how student performance in those areas changed over that period. Comparisons over
time in the area of science are somewhat more limited.
In the PISA test, each participating student spends two hours carrying out pencil-
and-paper tasks in reading, mathematics and science. The assessment includes tasks re-
quiring students to construct their own answers as well as multiple-choice questions.
In addition, students also answer a survey that takes about 30 minutes to complete and
that includes questions about their personal background.3 Description of the data
The first CDI exam took place in the academic year 2004/05, so we consider this as the
year in which the treatment (the introduction of a standardized exam) was first imple-
mented. For this reason, we compare the results of students of the region of Madrid in
(i) reading, using PISA 2000 and PISA 2009, and (ii) in mathematics, using PISA 2003
and PISA 2012.4
Our first methodology for analysis will be a diff-in-diff regression approach. We con-
struct the treatment and the control groups in the following way: the treatment group
before the treatment (the introduction of the CDI exam) is the group of students from
the region of Madrid who took the PISA exam in 2000 for reading or 2003 for math-
ematics, the treatment group after the treatment is the group of students who took the
PISA exam in 2009 for reading or 2012 for mathematics, and the control group is
formed by students from the other regions of Spain before (PISA 2000 or 2003) and
after the treatment (PISA 2009 or 2012).
The PISA questionnaire allows us to control for various student, family and school
characteristics. The student and family characteristics are: gender, age, nationality (im-
migrant or Spanish), parents’ nationality, languages other than Spanish spoken at home,
structure of the family (single parent family, nuclear family, mixed family), learning
time in hours per week in reading and mathematics (hours per week in Language or
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index) calculated by OECD.5 The school characteristics are the type of school (public,
charter or private), the location of the school (village, small town, town, city or large
city), student/teacher ratio, school size, whether the school uses assessments to com-
pare to district/national performance, whether the school uses assessments to make
judgments about teacher’s effectiveness, the proportion of girls in the school, the school
average of ESCS index, the percentage of immigrant students in school, and school
average learning time in reading and mathematics.
The tables below contain the descriptive statistics of these four groups for the most
relevant characteristics of students and schools. Table 1 describes the treatment and
the control groups in PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 in reading, and Table 2 describes the
two groups in PISA 2003 and PISA 2012 in mathematics.
The two tables show a very similar evolution of the characteristics of students and
schools when we compare PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 in reading and when we compare
PISA 2003 and PISA 2012 in mathematics.
If we compare the treatment group and the control group before and after the change
in reading, we can see patterns that are very similar across both groups: the proportion
of girls and students coming from single parent families decreases slightly, whereas age,
immigrants, learning time, and the Index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status
(ESCS) increases. This is consistent with the fact that Spain has experienced a large inflow
of immigrants in the last decade and has converged towards the EU and OECD GDP per
capita, a process that has, since 2009, reversed6 Nevertheless, the rise in the share of im-
migrants between 2000 and 2009 was higher in the region of Madrid (from 3% to 16%)
than in the rest of regions (from 2% to 9%). In addition, the share of students speaking
foreign languages other than Spanish increased in Madrid over the period (from 1% to
5%), whereas it remained constant in the control group (17% versus 16%).
If we look at the school characteristics, we observe a decrease in the number of
private schools and an increase in the number of charter schools over the period
2000–2009. This could be due to the fact that some private schools have demanded
and achieved from the public administration their transformation into charter schools,
thus lowering the fees to be paid by the student’s families and avoiding losing enrol-
ment. Nevertheless, the official data from the Statistical Office of the Spanish Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports shows that the rise in the students of charter schools
has come from a reduction in the number of students in the public schools. This is in
contrast with the PISA sample, which shows that the rise of the students in charter
schools come from a reduction in the private schools. That is, the PISA coverage of pri-
vate schools decreased from 2000 to 2009, whereas the coverage of public schools in-
creased. This could be due to the fact that the sample of schools in cities or large cities
in 2009 decreased, whereas those in towns and villages increased.
Student/teacher and school size ratio decreased in both groups. We also observe
that the percentage of schools that declare that they carry out assessments used to
compare the school to district/national performance or assessments used to make
judgments about teacher effectiveness increased in both the control and the treatment
group. In summary, the descriptive statistics show that the trends during the period
2000–2009 that we observe when we compare the treatment and control group are
similar.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of students and schools in PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 (reading)
Treatment group before
change - School Madrid
in PISA exam 2000
Control group before
change - School NO
Madrid in PISA exam 2000
Treatment group after
change - School Madrid
in PISA exam 2009
Control group after
change - School NO
Madrid in PISA exam 2009
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Subjects - Plausible values
Reading - PV1 510.16 79.75 245.12 697.46 491.56 84.70 150.64 777.08 504.38 85.14 74.61 721.54 483.75 89.49 6.65 814.71
Reading - PV2 509.94 82.20 204.02 711.64 491.47 84.37 151.55 756.66 504.39 85.52 91.12 822.19 483.82 89.90 60.42 824.33
Reading - PV3 510.29 81.44 237.66 716.00 491.89 84.88 157.91 768.72 503.43 83.68 60.18 733.45 483.84 89.65 19.36 814.71
Reading - PV4 508.55 81.72 229.34 710.26 491.36 84.87 117.01 751.45 503.58 85.14 80.22 702.07 483.67 90.16 29.15 877.24
Reading - PV5 508.86 81.96 176.62 709.59 491.23 85.21 112.65 782.35 504.67 84.54 124.31 729.32 483.96 89.75 64.42 904.50
Individual characteristics
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
Age 15.80 0.28 15.33 16.25 15.79 0.28 15.33 16.25 15.87 0.28 15.33 16.33 15.86 0.29 15.33 16.33
Immigrant 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Mother immigrant 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1
Father immigrant 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Languages other than Spanish
spoken at home
0.01 0.09 0 1 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
Single parent family 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Nuclear family 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.83 0.38 0 1 0.85 0.35 0 1
Mixed family 0.04 0.21 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.01 0.09 0 1 0.01 0.11 0 1
Learning time (hours/week) in Language 3.30 0.74 0.00 4.58 3.04 0.74 0.00 4.33 3.66 0.68 1.67 9.00 3.37 0.70 0.00 9.00
ESCS (Index of Economic, Social and
Cultural Status)
−0.16 1.01 −2.79 2.13 −0.40 1.05 −4.05 2.21 −0.09 1.05 −3.40 2.85 −0.26 1.05 −5.34 3.41
ESCS squared 1.05 1.14 0.00 7.80 1.26 1.42 0.00 16.42 1.11 1.30 0.00 11.57 1.18 1.44 0.00 28.54
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of students and schools in PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 (reading) (Continued)
School characteristics
Public school 0.56 0.50 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Private school 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1
Charter school 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.29 0.46 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
School in village 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
School in small town 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.24 0.42 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
School in town 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1
School in city 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1
School in large city 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.04 0.21 0 1 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.01 0.12 0 1
Student/teacher ratio 16.93 4.39 10.90 26.80 14.15 4.66 5.66 27.60 12.76 4.23 1.18 20.27 11.29 4.69 0.82 39.88
School size 1,048.43 493.49 335.00 2,139.00 725.64 345.15 93.00 1,742.00 851.82 416.07 100.00 2,268.00 685.72 392.01 44.00 2,785.00
Assessments used to compare the school
to district/national performance
0.32 0.47 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
Assessments used to make judgments
about teacher’s effectiveness
0.47 0.50 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1
No. of observations - schools 20 165 51 838
No. of observations - students 679 5535 1453 24434
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of students and schools in PISA 2003 and PISA 2012 (mathematics)
Treatment group before
change - School Madrid
in PISA exam 2003
Control group before
change - School NO
Madrid in PISA exam 2003
Treatment group after
change - School Madrid
in PISA exam 2012
Control group after
change - School NO
Madrid in PISA exam 2012
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Subjects - Plausible values
Mathematics - PV1 493.98 92.37 238.46 706.68 495.25 85.81 122.01 807.17 505.28 85.22 212.19 752.38 494.72 88.61 98.23 811.82
Mathematics - PV2 492.34 91.10 197.49 701.70 495.11 86.17 56.27 788.63 506.72 86.36 235.56 732.44 494.91 88.77 145.12 815.71
Mathematics - PV3 494.73 87.87 216.34 694.69 494.23 85.59 137.67 793.61 506.62 85.74 237.51 818.83 494.88 88.47 139.52 821.94
Mathematics - PV4 495.29 90.48 229.35 731.61 495.14 85.91 117.34 770.01 505.09 85.69 208.22 753.40 494.61 88.57 138.81 792.42
Mathematics - PV5 491.91 92.66 202.94 723.35 494.47 85.62 143.82 777.49 504.92 85.95 207.36 754.18 494.74 88.63 128.61 829.65
Individual characteristics
Female 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
Age 15.85 0.29 15.25 16.33 15.86 0.29 15.25 16.42 15.86 0.29 15.33 16.33 15.87 0.29 15.33 16.33
Immigrant 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Mother immigrant 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Father immigrant 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1
Language other than Spanish spoken
at home
0.04 0.19 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Single parent family 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1
Nuclear family 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.83 0.38 0 1 0.89 0.32 0 1 0.90 0.31 0 1
Other family 0.04 0.18 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.00 0.05 0 1 0.01 0.08 0 1
Learning time (hours/week) in
mathematics
3.05 0.60 0.92 7.33 2.97 0.73 0.00 15.00 3.56 1.02 2.25 14.00 3.46 0.66 2.25 16.00
ESCS (Index of Economic, Social and
Cultural Status)
−0.12 0.97 −3.74 2.10 −0.20 0.98 −3.40 2.39 0.12 1.01 −2.77 2.55 −0.13 1.00 −5.30 2.73
ESCS squared 0.94 1.38 0.00 13.96 1.00 1.28 0.00 11.55 1.03 1.14 0.00 7.67 1.02 1.17 0.00 28.09
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of students and schools in PISA 2003 and PISA 2012 (mathematics) (Continued)
School characteristics
Public school 0.54 0.50 0 1 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.64 0.48 0 1
Private school 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Charter school 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
School in village 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.06 0.23 0 1
School in small town 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
School in town 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1
School in city 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
School in large city 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.01 0.12 0 1
Student/teacher ratio 15.61 5.48 9.44 24.36 13.23 5.31 1.38 44.30 13.58 2.66 7.97 20.46 11.68 5.45 1.11 82.56
School size 880.37 401.45 389 1951 710.70 432.90 95 2819 861.37 433.83 161 2122 700.25 422.42 28 4128
Assessments used to compare the
school to district/national performance
0.12 0.33 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Assessments used to make judgements
about teacher’s effectiveness
0.24 0.42 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.62 0.49 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
No. of observations - schools 18 365 51 851
No. of observations - students 511 10280 1542 23771
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2003 and PISA 2012, the years we are using for the mathematics analysis. The only ex-
ceptions are the proportion of private and charter schools. In the case of private
schools, the indicator of the region of Madrid increased, whereas the one of the control
group slightly decreased. In the case of charter schools, their proportion decreased in
both the control and the treatment group.
4 Econometric methodology and results
In order to estimate the impact of the introduction of a standardized exam in the re-
gion of Madrid on students’ outcomes, we propose a diff-in-diff approach. We use as
the outcome for student performance the PISA reported scores of students. These are
calculated using imputation methods, denoting plausible values (OECD 2009). Thus,
for a given year t, the score of student i in reading in school j is given by:
yijt ¼ α0 þ α1 Madridj þ α2 PISA2009t þ δMadridj ⋅ PISA2009t þ β1xijt þ β2xjt ;
þ εijt
and the score of student i in mathematics in school j is given by:yijt ¼ α0 þ α1 Madridj þ α2 PISA2012t þ δMadridj ⋅PISA2012t þ β1xijt þ β2xjt þ εijt;
where xijt are observable characteristics of students and their families describedabove; xjt are observable characteristics of schools; Madridj is a dummy variable for the
schools located in the region of Madrid (i.e., it takes the value 1 for the treated group);
IPSA2009t and PISA2012t are dummy variables for students who took the PISA reading
exam in 2009 and the PISA mathematics exam in 2012, respectively (after the introduc-
tion of the standardized exam in the region of Madrid); Madridj PISA2009t and
Madridj PISA2012t indicate whether school j is in the region of Madrid and partici-
pated in PISA exam 2009 and in PISA exam in 2012, respectively (i.e., it takes the value
1 for the treated group after the treatment); and εijt is a random shock.
Our parameter of interest is δ, corresponding to the variable Madridj PISA2009t or
Madridj PISA2012t, which coincides with the introduction of a standardized exam (the
CDI exam) in the region of Madrid.
Tables 3 and 4 below show the results of the diff-in-diff estimation for reading using
the samples of students from Spain in PISA 2000 and PISA 2009, and for mathematics,
using the samples of students from Spain in PISA 2003 and PISA 2012. Since the PISA
database provides five plausible values, which are allocated to each student, we use
the methodology proposed by the OECD for the computation of regression coeffi-
cients and their respective standard errors. According to OECD (2009), statistical ana-
lyses should be performed independently on each of these five plausible values, and
results should be aggregated to obtain the final estimates of the statistics and their re-
spective standard errors.
The first column of the tables shows the estimation results without any control vari-
ables. This would be the raw average effect of our treatment. The second column in-
cludes individual characteristics of the students, and the third and the forth columns
gradually add school characteristics.
When we estimate the diff-in-diff without any covariates, the coefficient for the treat-
ment is not statistically significant for both reading and mathematics.
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a positive and statistically significant effect of our treatment on the PISA scores. In the sec-
ond column, when we control for individual characteristics of students, the coefficient of
the treatment variable is positive and significant7. The inclusion of school characteristics in
columns (3) and (4) does not change this result. We find a relative improvement in PISA
scores in reading in the region of Madrid between 2000 and 2009 of a magnitude of 14 to
17 PISA points that cannot be explained by observable variables.8 In 2009, Spain was signifi-
cantly below the OECD average in reading by 12 points. If the results are totally explained
by the introduction and publication of external exams, this could imply that generalizing
those exams would raise the level of Spain in reading above the OECD average.
In Table 4, we run the same estimations but for mathematics using the scores in
PISA 2003 and PISA 2012. Here, we find a positive impact of our treatment on stu-
dents’ performance; however, it is statistically significant only in the last specification.
The data seem to indicate that something differential has happened in Madrid be-
tween 2000 and 2009 with respect to other Spanish regions. A natural hypothesis in
this context is that the introduction and publication of the results of the standardized
exam played a major role in this change. It is very hard to provide definitive proof with
these data, but we can discard some alternative explanations.
Public spending in education per pupil affects to some extent students’ outcomes
(OECD 2010). The Spanish Ministry of Education provides data on public spending on
education per pupil by regions starting from 2004. During the period 2004–2009,
Madrid increased public education spending per pupil by 21%, less than the Spanish
average of 33%. More importantly, Madrid has been the region increasing the least edu-
cation spending per pupil among all the 17 Spanish regions. So, education expenditure
cannot explain the better behavior of Madrid PISA scores.
Spain received a large amount of immigrants between 2000 and 2009 (according to
data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE), immigrants went from 2%
to 12% of the population over the period), and Madrid was a major place of destination
(it has about 18% of the immigrants and about 13% of the population). But our data
can identify whether the student is an immigrant, and the number of immigrants vary
enough between schools that their effect is probably captured at the school level. This
was also a period of rapid economic growth, which was not identical between regions,
but the ESCS index has enough information about this variable at the individual level
to properly control for the effect of economic data. Some other factors affect schools
more directly. Madrid has a larger number of charter schools than other regions.
Madrid also has increased the share of charter schools, but this trend has been similar
to the rest of regions, if anything a little bit smaller. In any case, since the identity of
the schools is observable, its effect can be controlled.
The only other important institutional reform in Madrid schools in this period, be-
yond the introduction and publication of external exams, is the introduction of bilin-
gual schools in the region, where English is a medium of instruction for at least one
third of the time9 Although this is clearly an important reform, it has only been imple-
mented gradually starting from first grade, and the oldest students exposed to the pro-
gram are now 13 years old. In addition, Anghel et al. (2012) have not found significant
effects of the program in either language or mathematics, and possibly a negative effect
on natural and social science (the subjects taught in English).
Table 3 Difference in difference estimations for PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 in reading
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Madrid 13.620* 9.327 2.071 2.761
(8.107) (5.841) (8.001) (6.869)
Madrid*PISA2009 12.267 13.718** 16.985** 15.415**
(9.703) (6.867) (8.083) (7.657)
PISA2009 −13.185*** −9.499*** −5.448 −8.436**
(3.635) (2.995) (3.843) (3.744)
Student characteristics
Female 27.230*** 26.115*** 26.231***
(1.789) (1.781) (1.696)
Age 18.521*** 19.680*** 19.180***
(3.118) (3.372) (3.366)
Immigrant −17.608*** −16.988** −19.294***
(6.301) (6.778) (6.504)
Mother immigrant −13.890** −14.851** −11.932*
(6.766) (7.345) (7.027)
Father immigrant −8.080 −7.079 −5.043
(5.609) (5.983) (6.043)
Foreign language spoken at home −4.108 −2.888 −0.192
(2.689) (2.615) (2.721)
Single parent family −4.899** −5.730** −6.146***
(2.288) (2.312) (2.178)
Mixed family −22.204*** −24.441*** −25.051***
(5.404) (5.750) (5.911)
Learning time (hours/week) in reading −8.492*** −8.690*** −12.495***
(1.420) (1.545) (1.587)
ESCS (Index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status) 27.955*** 24.845*** 19.628***
(1.100) (1.072) (0.852)
ESCS squared −1.564** −1.868** −1.656**
(0.757) (0.763) (0.710)
School characteristics
Private school 23.473*** −3.719
(8.548) (8.095)
Charter school 12.103** −1.032
(5.776) (5.099)
School in small town 1.078 1.581
(6.443) (4.890)
School in town 1.749 0.086
(6.653) (5.042)
School in city 7.013 4.163
(7.233) (5.556)
School in large city 12.746 8.784
(8.965) (6.671)
Student/teacher ratio 0.038 0.373
(0.657) (0.544)
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Table 3 Difference in difference estimations for PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 in reading
(Continued)
School size 0.005 −0.006*
(0.004) (0.004)
Assessments used to compare the school to district/national
performance
−1.527 −2.520
(2.993) (2.959)
Assessments used to make judgments about teacher’s
effectiveness
0.592 −0.442
(2.669) (2.389)
Proportion of girls in school −14.228
(13.844)
School average of ESCS index 23.880***
(2.808)
School average of ESCS index squared −8.226***
(2.706)
% of Immigrant students in school 0.471
(0.451)
% of Mother immigrants in school −0.109
(0.336)
% of Father immigrants in school −0.538
(0.415)
School average learning time (hours/week) in reading 11.089***
(3.485)
Constant 490.770*** 229.792*** 197.296*** 221.023***
(2.793) (49.645) (54.414) (55.028)
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
2. Base categories for dummies: male, student Spain, Mother Spain, Father Spain, Nuclear family, Public school,
School in village.
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In this section, we use the methodology proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie et al. (2010), which applies synthetic control methods to comparative case studies.
Their methodology is motivated by the fact that in comparative case studies, the researcher
is usually forced to find similarities between treated and non-treated units using observable
characteristics, something that it is often difficult in practice. To solve this problem they
propose constructing a combination of units for comparison purposes, since the combin-
ation will typically resemble the treated unit much better than any single unit alone.
In our case, we have to construct a combination of Spanish regions that resembles the
region of Madrid in terms of various characteristics before the treatment, and we observe
the evolution of this combination in the absence of treatment. This combination is called
a synthetic control group. It is constructed by searching for a weighted combination of
the untreated Spanish regions, in terms of various predictor variables, which are averaged
over the entire pre-intervention period.
Abadie et al. (2010) argue that matching on pre-intervention outcomes helps to control
for unobserved factors affecting the outcome of interest as well as for the heterogeneity of
the effect of the observed and unobserved factors on the outcome of interest. According
to Abadie et al. (2010), “once it has been established that the unit representing the case of
interest and the synthetic control unit have similar behavior over extended periods of time
Table 4 Difference in difference estimations for PISA 2003 and PISA 2012 in mathematics
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Madrid 9.580 7.133 −4.163 −7.149
(9.973) (5.889) (7.635) (7.098)
Madrid*PISA2012 12.826 8.523 12.794 15.014**
(10.412) (6.807) (8.019) (7.616)
PISA2012 −2.396 3.678 2.655 2.444
(3.258) (2.470) (3.334) (4.038)
Student characteristics
Female −12.249*** −12.394*** −13.335***
(1.684) (1.663) (1.704)
Age 16.332*** 15.687*** 16.237***
(3.578) (3.536) (3.457)
Immigrant −16.357** −15.323** −16.337**
(7.381) (7.733) (7.564)
Mother immigrant −11.877** −10.949** −9.941*
(5.123) (5.167) (5.629)
Father immigrant −10.109* −13.621** −10.678*
(5.846) (6.207) (6.100)
Foreign language spoken at home 2.687 0.741 0.245
(2.535) (2.893) (3.091)
Single parent family −5.800** −6.578*** −7.670***
(2.703) (2.548) (2.550)
Other family −11.687* −12.833** −14.199**
(6.380) (6.403) (6.407)
Learning time (hours/week) in mathematics −4.703*** −6.415*** −4.428**
(1.581) (1.670) (2.048)
ESCS (Index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status) 31.585*** 28.372*** 22.565***
(1.216) (1.364) (1.149)
ESCS squared 0.235 −0.373 0.307
(0.670) (0.809) (0.833)
School characteristics
Private school 17.595*** 1.136
(6.100) (6.497)
Charter school 15.084*** 7.133*
(4.309) (3.943)
School in small town 1.443 3.907
(5.362) (6.220)
School in town −0.156 1.079
(5.769) (6.134)
School in city 3.369 4.468
(5.908) (6.456)
School in large city 16.060* 18.122*
(8.825) (9.288)
Student/teacher ratio 0.001 −0.170
(0.373) (0.348)
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Table 4 Difference in difference estimations for PISA 2003 and PISA 2012 in mathematics
(Continued)
School size 0.005 −0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Assessments used to compare the school to
district/national performance
4.754 1.931
(2.917) (2.688)
Assessments used to make judgements about
teacher’s effectiveness
−2.688 −2.103
(3.352) (3.104)
Propotion of girls in school 47.438***
(17.498)
School average of ESCS index 25.561***
(3.435)
School average of ESCS index squared −10.033***
(3.860)
% of Immigrant students in school 0.443
(0.346)
% of Mother immigrants in school −0.030
(0.355)
% of Father immigrants in school −0.593
(0.370)
School average learning time (hours/week) in mathematics −2.967
(4.544)
Constant 483.786*** 259.479*** 266.709*** 265.572***
(2.370) (57.943) (56.686) (57.408)
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
2. Base categories for dummies: male, student Spain, Mother Spain, Father Spain, Nuclear family, Public school,
School in village.
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is interpreted as produced by the intervention itself.”
In order to construct the synthetic control group (the synthetic Madrid), we have to
aggregate the data at the school level and then at the regional level. The year the CDI
standardized exam was launched in the region of Madrid was 2004/05; therefore, we
have two years in PISA of pre-treatment data (PISA 2000 and 2003). PISA 2006 and PISA
2009 will be our post-treatment period. The synthetic Madrid is constructed as a weighted
average of the pool of untreated regions. Our donor pool includes 15 regions10. The
weights are chosen so that the resulting synthetic Madrid resembles the real Madrid as
closely as possible in terms of the values of a set of predictors of students’ performance
before the introduction of the CDI exam, that is, before the treatment.
We include in the list of predictor variables for calculating the weights the following
variables: student/teacher ratio, school size, ESCS school index, proportion of immi-
grants in the school and proportion of repeaters in the school. All variables are aver-
aged at the regional level and over the pre-intervention period (2000 and 2003).
Using these predictor variables we construct the synthetic Madrid as the convex combin-
ation of regions which most closely resembles the region of Madrid in the pre-treatment
period. This matching contributes to accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the
Table 5 Predictor means for PISA student performance
Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics
Madrid Madrid Average of 15 regions
Predictor balance Real Synthetic Real Synthetic
Student/teacher ratio 16.18 15.00 16.18 14.85 14.03 14.03
School size 933.74 852.74 933.74 907.70 720.08 720.08
School average of ESCS index −0.16 −0.19 −0.16 −0.16 −0.31 −0.31
% of immigrant students in school 5.43 3.35 5.43 2.52 2.77 2.77
% of repeaters in school 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.27 0.27
PISA score 2000 506.80 500.46 490.83 493.04 496.92 482.30
PISA score 2003 490.66 480.00 492.11 485.63 488.63 493.23
PISA score 2006 477.27 474.42 500.11 502.07 471.05 492.25
PISA score 2009 500.86 483.61 494.63 495.33 484.70 490.64
Note: All variables, except PISA scores, are averaged at the regional level for the pre-treatment period (2000 and 2003).
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region, of the synthetic Madrid region and of the donor pool (the average of the 16 regions
which form the donor pool) in terms of the control variables. The figures prove that the
constructed synthetic Madrid is much more similar to the real one, in both reading and
mathematics, than the simple average of the regions that form the donor pool. In reading,
the student/teacher ratio in the real Madrid is 16.18, and in the synthetic Madrid it is 15
(the average of the control group is 14.03). Average school size is 933.74 in the real Madrid
and 852.74 in synthetic Madrid (the average of the donor pool is 720.08). The school aver-
age of the ESCS index is −0.16 in the real Madrid and −0.19 in the synthetic Madrid (the
average of the control group is −0.31). It terms of the percentage of repeaters, we find that
the synthetic region and the control group are both quite similar to the real Madrid.
Finally, there is a substantial difference in the percentage of immigrant students betweenTable 6 Region weights in the synthetic Madrid
Region Weight reading Weight mathematics
Andalucia 0 0
Aragón 0.454 0.801
Asturias 0.286 0
Canary Islands 0.259 0.199
Cantabria 0 0
Castilla - La Mancha 0 0
Castilla-León 0 0
Cataluña 0 0
Extremadura 0 0
Galicia 0 0
La Rioja 0 0
Murcia 0 0
Navarra 0 0
País Vasco 0 0
Valencia 0 0
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Figure 1 The evolution of the real Madrid and the synthetic Madrid in reading in 2000, 2003, 2006
and 2009.
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thetic and the real Madrid in students’ PISA outcomes as well.
Table 6 displays the weights of the 15 regions from the donor pool in the synthetic
Madrid. It shows that the students’ performance in the region of Madrid is best ap-
proximated by a combination of Aragón, Asturias and the Canary Islands for reading
and Aragón and the Canary Islands for mathematics. The rest of the regions in the
donor pool are assigned zero weights.
The two graphs in Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the real Madrid and the syn-
thetic Madrid in 2000 and 2003 (the pre-intervention years) and in 2006 and 2009 (the
post-intervention years), separately for reading and for mathematics (Figures 1 and 2).
For reading, the graph shows that the synthetic Madrid approximates very well the
evolution of the real Madrid in the pre-treatment period. After the treatment, which
we take to be the introduction of the CDI standardized exam in the region of Madrid
until 2006, PISA scores decrease in both real Madrid and synthetic Madrid. After 2006,
even if both real Madrid and synthetic Madrid experience an increasing trend, synthetic48
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Figure 2 The evolution of the real Madrid and the synthetic Madrid in mathematics in 2000, 2003,
2006 and 2009.
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17.24 PISA points in favor of real Madrid. This difference could be attributed to the
introduction of a standardized exam in the region of Madrid, at least with the informa-
tion that we can observe. This confirms, even quantitatively, the results we obtained
previously with the diff-in-diff methodology, where we found that controlling for school
characteristics, that the region of Madrid improved its performance relative to other re-
gions of Spain in the period between 2000 and 2009 by between 14 and 17 PISA points.
The flagship education publication of the OECD, Education at a Glance, arrives at a
similar conclusion in the latest 2012 edition, stating, “students in school systems that
use standards-based external examinations score 16 points higher, on average across
OECD countries, than students in school systems that do not use these examinations
(Education at a Glance, 2012, page 527).” Our estimation is a slightly lower than the
range found in the literature by Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) of 20% to 40% of
the standard deviation (20 to 40 points in PISA).
For mathematics, however, the synthetic control group methodology does not work
so well. The synthetic Madrid does not approximate very well the evolution of the real
Madrid in 2000 and 2003, the pre-treatment period. In the post-treatment period, the
synthetic Madrid performs slightly better than the real Madrid. Nevertheless, the diff-
in-diff estimation showed no strong statistical impact in mathematics.
As a robustness check, we introduce other variables among the predictor variables,
which have been specified above. In particular, we include the average percentage of
girls in the PISA exam and the average proportion of public, charter and private
schools. Our results do not change significantly.
We are aware of the limitations of our data in performing the estimation by using
synthetic control methods. One of the main limitations is that since the PISA study
started in 2000, and it is carried out each three years, we only have two years of pre-
intervention data (2000 and 2003), which complicates the calculations of the region
weights for the synthetic control group. The result in mathematics, where the synthetic
Madrid is not so similar to the real Madrid in the year before the treatment can be
partly explained by this fact.6 Conclusions
This paper attempts to identify whether the implementation and publication of the re-
sults of external and standardized tests could have any impact on the performance of
students. We use the fact that in the region of Madrid, a standardized exam was first
given (and its results published) in 2004/05 to all 6th grade primary students, while in
the other regions of Spain, no such exam existed. Using a diff-in-diff strategy, we find a
positive effect in reading of the order of 14 to 17 PISA points. The synthetic control
method yields an effect that is very close even in quantitative terms. Our results are in
line with previous research in the area, but our study provides one important
innovation, since the external exams in Madrid have no consequences for the students,
the effect has to come from the impact on teachers and school principals.
We have identified a possible effect in language, but not in mathematics. This is
slightly surprising since many educational programs have observed effects that are lar-
ger in mathematics than in language (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011). A possible
Anghel et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:7 Page 19 of 20explanation may come from the different emphasis of the curricula of primary school
education in Spain with respect to other countries, but this question deserves a more
thorough investigation, which we defer to further research.Endnotes
1Even in countries where school zones comprise a single school, concerned parents
can decide where to live using school quality as an input to their choice.
2See, e.g., Bishop (1997) for Canadian provinces, Jürges et al. (2005) and Wößmann
(2010) for Germany, and Bishop et al. (2001) for US states.
3A student with good grades in compulsory secondary schooling and a good mark in
the CDI test obtains a certification with Merit or with Distinction. As it is just a certifi-
cate, it has no implications for admissions to schools beyond the compulsory schooling
or for grants, nor is there evidence that employers look at those distinctions. For
students with really extraordinary grades (only 25 a year in a region with over 50,000
students in the last year of compulsory secondary schooling), they can obtain an Extra-
ordinary Award yielding a cash prize of 1,000 Euros and a trip to a “cultural
destination.”
4We will not use the PISA scores in science, since the first year science was the main
focus was 2006, and this is after our treatment was applied.
5The PISA index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS) was derived from the
following three indices: highest occupational status of parents, highest educational level
of parents in years of education according to ISCED and home possessions (OECD
2010).
6Spain went from less than 1% of immigrants in the population to almost 10% during
this period. The Spanish GDP per capita in PPS terms increased from 97% of that of
the EU-27 in 2000 to 103% in 2009 (Source: Eurostat).
7In an additional specification, we dropped the ESCS index, which is an aggre-
gated index of the socioeconomic background of the students, and we controlled
separately for the labor market situation and the level of education of the mother
and the father. Our results did not change significantly. These results are available
upon request.
8In additional estimations not reported here, we estimated the same specifications for
three schools that performed PISA in reading in both 2000 and 2009. We performed
the diff-in-diff estimation for each of these three schools separately, and then we con-
sidered as the treatment group the group of these three schools. For two of the schools,
we found a positive and significant effect of the treatment on PISA scores. Results of
these estimations are available upon request.
9Students not only study English as a foreign language, but also some subjects (at
least science, history and geography) are taught in English. Spanish and mathematics
are taught only in Spanish.
10There are 17 regions (including the Madrid region) and two autonomous cities
(Ceuta and Melilla) in Spain. We had to drop Baleares and Ceuta and Melilla because
of missing data, so this leaves us with 15 regions.
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